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COMPETITION LAW AND POLICY IN
MEXICO: SUCCESSES AND CHALLENGES
UMUT AYDIN*
I
INTRODUCTION
Mexico adopted its first competition law, the Federal Law on Economic
Competition (Ley Federal de Competencia Económica (FLEC)) in 1992,1 in
preparation for the signing of the North American Free Trade Agreement
(NAFTA) which required the three signatory states to have national competition
laws.2 A comprehensive legislation on competition that included prohibitions
against cartels, abuses of dominance, and that required merger review, as well as
an agency to implement these laws, was a new phenomenon for Mexico. As is
frequently the case with legal transplants, at the time, few domestic actors knew
what competition law meant and what impact, if any, it would have on them. For
the Federal Commission of Competition (Comisión Federal de Competencia
(FCC)), the early years were a period of trial and error, and the experience
proved taxing. Government and private actors criticized the FCC for being weak,
court proceedings triggered by companies’ complaints slowed down
investigations,3 and a number of the FCC’s decisions were reversed by the district
courts on procedural grounds.4
Fast forward to 2015, and the competition policy scene has changed
dramatically in Mexico. Mexican competition law and policy have become more
effective thanks to a series of legislative reforms starting in 2006. Reforms in
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1. Ley Federal de Competencia Económica [LFCE] [Federal Competition Law], Diario Oficial de
la Federación [DOF] 24-12-1992 (Mex.).
2. North American Free Trade Agreement, U.S.–Can.–Mex., art. 1501, ¶ 1, Dec. 17, 1992, 32 I.L.M.
289 (1993).
3. ORG. FOR ECON. CO-OPERATION & DEV. [OECD], REGULATORY REFORM IN MEXICO: THE
ROLE OF COMPETITION POLICY IN REGULATORY REFORM 8 (1998) [hereinafter OECD 1998].
4. ORG. FOR ECON. CO-OPERATION & DEV. [OECD], COMPETITION LAW AND POLICY IN
MEXICO: AN OECD PEER REVIEW 45 (2004) [hereinafter OECD 2004].
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20065 and 20116 increased the investigative powers of the FCC by introducing a
leniency program, the power to conduct dawn raids, and higher maximum fines
for competition infringements. After a constitutional amendment in 2013, the
FCC was reconstituted as an autonomous body, renamed the Federal
Commission of Economic Competition (Comisión Federal de Competencia
Económica (COFECE)).7 The 2013 reforms also established specialized antitrust
courts, and the Federal Institute for Telecommunications (Instituto Federal de
Telecomunicaciones (IFETEL)), an independent regulator responsible for
enforcing competition law in the telecommunications and broadcasting sectors.8
In 2014, the Mexican Congress passed a new competition law, further increasing
the COFECE’s powers.9 The Mexican competition regime has also become more
effective as a result of a gradual learning process by the FCC and later the
COFECE. Over time, the agencies have improved the legal reasoning and the
economic analysis in their investigations and decisions, and have become more
transparent and better able to communicate with political, economic, and societal
actors.
Thanks to these developments, the COFECE has become a well-respected
enforcement agency, ranking above some Western European competition
agencies with longer histories and much greater resources in the Global
Competition Review’s annual rankings.10 Mexico has also climbed from a low of
116th place in 2010 to 67th in “effectiveness of anti-monopoly policy” according
to the World Economic Forum’s competitiveness index in 2015.11 The COFECE
participates actively in international forums such as the International
Competition Network (ICN) and the Organization for Economic Cooperation

5. Decreto por el que se reforman, adicionan, y derogan diversas disposiciones de la Ley Federal
de Competencia Económica [LFCE] [Federal Competition Law], Diario Oficial de la Federación [DOF]
28-6-2006 (Mex.).
6. Decreto por el que se reforman, adicionan y derogan diversas disposiciones de la Ley Federal
de Competencia Económica [LFCE] [Federal Competition Law], del Código Penal Federal y del Código
Fiscal de la Federación, Diario Oficial de la Federación [DOF] 10-5-2011 (Mex.).
7. Decreto por el que se reforman y adicionan diversas disposiciones de los artículos 6o., 7o., 27,
28, 73, 78, 94 y 105 de la Constitución Política de los Estados Unidos Mexicanos, en materia de
telecomunicaciones, art. 28, Diario Oficial de la Federación [DOF] 11-6-2013 (Mex.).
8. Id.
9. Decreto por el que se expide la Ley Federal de Competencia Económica y se reforman y
adicionan diversos artículos del Código Penal Federal, Diario Oficial de la Federación [DO] 23 Mayo de
2014 (Mex.); GLOB. COMPETITION REV., Mexico’s Federal Competition Commission, in RATING
ENFORCEMENT 2015 (2015) [hereinafter GCR 2015].
10. See GLOB. COMPETITION REV., RATING ENFORCEMENT 2015: STAR RATINGS (2015)
[hereinafter GCR 2015 STAR RATINGS].
11. The Global Competitiveness Index Historical Dataset 2005–2016 (XLS), WORLD ECON. F.
(Effectiveness of Anti-Monopoly Policy, code 6.03), http://reports.weforum.org/global-competitivenessreport-2015-2016 [https://perma.cc/9MX9-F7FC; https://perma.cc/S5WP-V54F].
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and Development (OECD),12 and is held up in the Latin American and
Caribbean region as a model.13
This article explores the factors that have contributed to the transformation
of the Mexican competition regime from a relatively ineffective one in a highly
concentrated economy to a relative success story. The gradual strengthening of
competition law in Mexico is fascinating because political, economic, and social
conditions tip the scales in the opposite direction: a history of high state
involvement in the economy,14 high economic concentration,15 well-organized
business interests,16 weak regulatory institutions,17 and a general lack of trust in
market mechanisms18 make Mexico an unlikely case for success. An agency
relatively well endowed with financial and human resources in an upper-middleincome country, the FCC/COFECE have also had advantages compared to
agencies in poorer countries. However, national income or agency resources do
not completely explain the trajectory of the Mexican competition regime: An
agency with sufficient resources could still be ineffective.19 The analysis presented
here goes beyond a focus on resources and emphasizes instead the politics, both
domestic and international, of agency effectiveness.
The gradual strengthening of the Mexican competition regime can be
explained by the interplay of domestic and international political factors.
Domestically, a constituency in favor of better competition policy enforcement
composed of consumers and consumer organizations, think tanks and business
associations, firms traditionally excluded from markets, and lawyers and the bar
association gradually emerged and gained a voice in Mexico. This domestic
constituency has been crucial for the reforms in two ways. First, these domestic
12. See comments by Michael D. Blechman, Omar Guerrero Rodriguez, & Ali Haddou, Panel
Discussion: Antitrust developments in India and Mexico, in ANNUAL PROCEEDINGS OF THE FORDHAM
COMPETITION LAW INSTITUTE: INTERNATIONAL ANTITRUST LAW AND POLICY 409, 433–34 (Barry E.
Hawk ed., 2013).
13. Claudia Schatan & Eugenio Rivera, Markets in Central America and Mexico: What is Happening
with Competition?, in COMPETITION POLICIES IN EMERGING ECONOMIES 7, 8 (Eugenio Rivera and
Claudia Schatan eds., 2008); not for attribution interviews conducted by the author, Washington, D.C.
(Mar. 25, 2015) and Chicago (Apr. 17, 2015).
14. Judith A. Teichman, The Evolution of Public Enterprise in Mexico, in PRIVATIZATION AND
POLITICAL CHANGE IN MEXICO 26, 26 (1995).
15. Alex E. Fernández Jilberto & Barbara Hogenboom, Latin American Conglomerates in the
Neoliberal Era: The Politics of Economic Concentration in Chile and Mexico, in BIG BUSINESS AND
ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT: CONGLOMERATES AND ECONOMIC GROUPS IN DEVELOPING COUNTRIES
AND TRANSITION ECONOMIES UNDER GLOBALISATION 135, 136–37 (Alex E. Fernández Jilberto &
Barbara Hogenboom eds., 2007).
16. Ben Ross Schneider, Why Is Mexican Business So Organized?, 37 LATIN AM. RES. REV. 77, 78
(2002).
17. WORLD BANK, REPORT NO. 37293-MX, DEMOCRATIC GOVERNANCE IN MEXICO: BEYOND
STATE CAPTURE AND SOCIAL POLARIZATION 40 (2007); Jacint Jordana, Autonomous Regulatory
Agencies in Democratic Mexico, 16 LAW & BUS. REV. AM. 753, 756 (2010).
18. OECD 2004, supra note 4, at 12.
19. See generally Umut Aydin & Tim Büthe, Competition Law & Policy in Developing Countries:
Explaining Variations in Outcomes; Exploring Possibilities and Limits, 79 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS., no.
4, 2016 (discussing resource constraints as only one of many obstacles).
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actors initiate complaints before the FCC/COFECE, participate in class actions,
and demand more transparency and accountability from the FCC/COFECE, thus
contributing to strengthening the enforcement of competition law in Mexico. The
pro-competition domestic constituency has also indirectly influenced legislative
reforms by electorally supporting politicians advocating reforms.
The impact of this domestic constituency is reinforced by international
factors, such as pressures from foreign firms trying to break into the Mexican
market, as well as support and pressure from international organizations, in
particular the OECD, the World Bank, the International Monetary Fund, and
the ICN. The recommendations of international organizations were influential in
shaping the legislative reforms as well as the gradual improvements in the FCC’s
performance. These organizations have also helped steer political support for the
FCC in its negotiations with domestic political actors. International actors have
reinforced the domestic pro-competition constituency by cooperating with and
providing support to think tanks and non-governmental organizations.
The rest of the article is organized as follows: Part II explains what is meant
by effectiveness of competition law and policy, and describes the changes in the
effectiveness of the Mexican regime over time. Part III presents a brief overview
of the process that led to the adoption of the first competition law in Mexico in
1992. Part IV reviews the provisions of the law and the organizational makeup of
the FCC. Part V discusses the obstacles that the FCC faced in its early years in
implementing the Mexican competition law. Part VI explains how reforms have
addressed those obstacles, and Part VII discusses the factors that made these
reforms possible. Part VIII concludes.
II
DEFINING EFFECTIVENESS OF COMPETITION LAW AND POLICY
In defining the “effectiveness” or “success” of competition law and policy,
this article focuses on the extent to which a country’s competition regime
advances the various goals attributed to competition law and policy in developing
countries, as discussed in the introductory article to this symposium.20 Rather
than relying on a quantitative metric of effectiveness, though one is offered, this
article aims to qualitatively assess how reforms to the competition regime in
Mexico have contributed to advancing these goals.
Effectiveness of a competition regime is sometimes measured by the regime’s
impact on indicators such as aggregate economic growth, inward foreign
investment flows, democracy, or corruption; however, it is difficult to link these
outcomes directly to the operation of a competition regime in a country.21 Other
typical metrics employed to measure effectiveness of competition laws in
quantitative studies such as the World Economic Forum’s “effectiveness of
antimonopoly law” or “intensity of local competition” are not very helpful

20. Id. at 4–14.
21. See generally id.
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either.22 These indicators are based on surveys that might be measuring
respondents’ general perceptions of the economy and not specifically the
effectiveness of competition regimes.23 Moreover, because these data only go
back to 2006—the year that reforms to the Mexican competition regime started—
they do not allow for a before and after comparison of the effectiveness of
competition law and policy in Mexico.
Global Competition Review’s annual rating of enforcement agencies is more
helpful, because the rankings are based on an in-depth evaluation of both the
legislation and the annual enforcement performance of agencies.24 The rating—
ranging from two stars to five, from the least to the most successful—is useful as
a measure of how international and national experts evaluate the overall
performance of a competition agency, and is accompanied by a narrative
explaining the reasons behind the score. Competition agencies included in the
annual rating care deeply about it, and many, including the COFECE, use this as
one of the benchmarks of their performance in their annual reports.25 In Global
Competition Review’s rating, Mexico has climbed from two stars in 2002, the first
year it was included in the ratings,26 to three stars since 2014, a ranking it shares
with competition agencies of Austria, Finland, New Zealand, and Sweden among
others, and above those of Belgium, Denmark, and Ireland.27
While useful as a summary measure, Global Competition Review’s rating by
itself is not very informative about the various dimensions of effectiveness that
are introduced in this symposium. This article draws on the framework offered in
the introductory article to the symposium to offer a more nuanced evaluation of
effectiveness. It focuses on the extent to which the competition regime of a
country advances the goals attributed to competition law and policy in
developing countries: increasing economic efficiency, contributing to economic
and human development, unleashing rivalry in the private sector and vis-à-vis the
state, fostering a competition culture, and advancing economic and political
freedom.28 These goals not only reflect the debate in the literature on competition
law and policy in developing countries, but also have a significant overlap with
the objectives of competition policy defined by the Mexican competition law

22. See WORLD ECON. F., supra note 11.
23. On cognitive problems and systematic biases in surveys, see generally Marianne Bertrand &
Sendhil Mullainathan, Do People Mean What They Say? Implications for Subjective Survey Data, 91 AM.
ECON. REV. 67 (2001); Benjamin A. Olken, Corruption Perceptions vs. Corruption Reality, 93 J. PUB.
ECON. 950, 951 (2009) (finding biases in perceptions of corruption in a survey of Indonesian villagers
regarding a road-building project).
24. On this point, see Serdar Dalkir, A Quantitative Evaluation of Effectiveness and Efficacy of
Competition Policies across Countries, in 2 POLITICS TRUMPS ECONOMICS: POLITICAL ECONOMY AND
THE IMPLEMENTATION OF COMPETITION LAW AND REGULATION IN DEVELOPING COUNTRIES 226,
231 n.85 (Pradeep S. Mehta & Simon J. Evenett eds., 2009) (citing Eleanor Fox).
25. Not for attribution interviews conducted by the author, Paris, Fr. (July 7, 2015).
26. GLOB. COMPETITION REV., RATING ENFORCEMENT 2002 11 (2002) [hereinafter GCR 2002].
27. GCR 2015 STAR RATINGS, supra note 10.
28. Aydin & Büthe, supra note 19, at 4–14.
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(economic efficiency)29 and the COFECE in its first strategic plan covering the
period 2014 through 2017 (advancing economic development, advocacy vis-à-vis
the state, and fostering a competition culture).30 A brief qualitative assessment of
how reforms to the Mexican competition regime have advanced effectiveness in
terms of each of these goals follows.
A. Maximizing Efficiency
Efficiency maximization as a goal of competition policy signifies focusing on
enforcement against anti-competitive practices that are most likely to cause
efficiency losses, such as cartels.31 Cartel enforcement, which suffered in the
initial years of the FCC’s life,32 has become a priority with the introduction of a
leniency program in 2006, the ability to conduct dawn raids and to impose
criminal sanctions in 2011, and increases in maximum fines in 2011 and 2014.
These reforms have had tangible results: a growing number of cartels are being
investigated and higher fines have been imposed.33
B. Contributing To Economic And Human Development
Competition agencies in developing countries may contribute to economic
and human development in various ways, notably by focusing enforcement
efforts on sectors that have a direct impact on the well-being of the poor, as well
as aiming to increase market participation from previously excluded segments of
the population.34 While the FCC long realized the importance of targeting
enforcement at areas that could have a direct impact on the poor—as evidenced
by its early efforts to address anti-competitive activities in staple food products
such as tortillas35—after the 2014 reforms, this has become one of the priorities
29. Ley Federal de Competencia Económica [LFCE] [Federal Competition Law] art. 2o, Diario
Oficial de la Federación [DOF] 24-12-1992 (Mex.); AMERICAN BAR ASSOCIATION, SECTION OF
ANTITRUST LAW, REPORT OF THE TASK FORCE OF THE ABA SECTION OF ANTITRUST LAW ON THE
COMPETITION DIMENSION OF NAFTA 48 (1994).
30. COMISIÓN FEDERAL DE COMPETENCIA ECONÓMICO, PLAN ESTRATÉGICO 2014–2017 18–21
(2015).
31. Aydin & Büthe, supra note 19, at 6.
32. Gabriel Castañedo, Mexico’s Competition Regime: Walking the Walk, Slowly, 6 COMPETITION
L. INT’L 37, 39 (2010).
33. Author’s calculations from statistics in Rating Enforcement: Federal Competition Commission
of Mexico, GLOB. COMPETITION REVIEW (2004–2015), http://globalcompetitionreview.com/
surveys/archive [https://perma.cc/V6D2-NQUP]. In the early and mid-2000s, cartel fines averaged under
a million euros, whereas after 2008, average fines in most years were over a million euros. While data are
not clear cut in terms of number of cartel investigations and decisions, after 2008, there has been a steady
stream of leniency applications, dawn raids, and decisions that resulted in fines.
34. Aditya Bhattacharjea, Who Needs Antitrust? Or, Is Developing-Country Antitrust Different? A
Historical-Comparative Analysis, in COMPETITION LAW AND DEVELOPMENT 52, 53 (Daniel D. Sokol,
Thomas K. Cheng, & Ioannis Lianos eds., 2013); Aydin & Büthe, supra note 19, at 7–8.
35. See, e.g., COMISIÓN FEDERAL DE COMPETENCIA, INFORME DE COMPETENCIA ECONÓMICA
2003, 15 (2003) (on CFC’s investigations on anti-competitive behavior in sectors such as milk, tortillas,
soft drinks, among others, with impact on broad intermediate and final consumption); Fernando Sánchez
Ugarte, Diez Años de Política de Competencia, in LA PRIMERA DÉCADA DE LA COMISIÓN FEDERAL
DE COMPETENCIA 25, 93 (2003) (on CFC’s emphasis on absolute monopolistic practices in sectors that
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of the COFECE.36 A market study on the agro-food sector completed at the end
of 2015, for instance, has the goal of benefiting low-income consumers.37
C. Unleashing Rivalry In The Private Sector
In terms of unleashing rivalry in the private sector, the initial challenge is to
build an agency’s analytical capacity for identifying impediments to competition
in the private sector, followed by efforts to remedy them. Along these lines, the
FCC conducted market studies in sectors such as finance, pharmaceuticals, buses,
and airlines with varying degrees of success in dismantling barriers.38 Reforms in
2011 and 2014 increased the FCC/COFECE’s capacity by formally granting it the
power to conduct market studies.39 The COFECE cannot take direct measures in
the markets based on the conclusions of market studies; however, it can use these
as a basis for advocacy efforts vis-à-vis the public and private sectors. Its newly
acquired power to conduct market studies gives the COFECE a sound basis for
unleashing rivalry in the private sector.
D. Unleashing Rivalry Vis-à-Vis The State
Closely related is the goal of unleashing rivalry vis-à-vis the state. The FCC
has had an important advocacy role vis-à-vis the state since its establishment, with
the power to issue non-binding opinions on existing legislation, and upon the
invitation of the executive branch, on new legislation. Some of its early advocacy
efforts were criticized for not being effective, such as for failing to prevent the
government’s nationalization of various sugar factories in 2001,40 but they have
gradually begun to have tangible impacts, such as in the reform of the pension
system as well as in the privatization of national airlines and the entry of low-cost
airlines in the market.41 The 2006 reform allowed the FCC to give binding
influence low-income consumers).
36. COMISIÓN FEDERAL DE COMPETENCIA ECONÓMICO, supra note 30, at 23 tbl.2.
37. See COMISIÓN FEDERAL DE COMPETENCIA ECONÓMICA, REPORTE SOBRE LAS CONDICIONES
DE COMPETENCIA EN EL SECTOR AGROALIMENTARIO 9 (2015) (describing the importance of the agrofood sector for consumers, especially in low-income sectors of society, as a motivation for the market
study).
38. For reports resulting from these market studies, see COMISIÓN FEDERAL DE COMPETENCIA &
ORG. FOR ECON. COOPERATION & DEV., RECOMENDACIONES PARA PROMOVER UN MARCO
REGULATORIO MÁS FAVORABLE A LA COMPETENCIA EN EL MERCADO FARMACÉUTICO (2009);
COMISIÓN FEDERAL DE COMPETENCIA & ORG. FOR ECON. COOPERATION & DEV., REGULACIÓN Y
COMPETENCIA EN EL AUTOTRANSPORTE FORÁNEO DE PASAJEROS (2009); AGUSTIN J. ROS, A
COMPETITION POLICY ASSESSMENT OF THE DOMESTIC AIRLINE SECTOR IN MEXICO AND
RECOMMENDATIONS TO IMPROVE COMPETITION (2010). See generally Juan Manuel Espino, México, in
PROMOTING MARKET STUDIES IN LATIN AMERICA, Conference organized by United Nations
Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean, 18–19 Mar. 2015, Santiago, Chile, 9 (2015)
(describing the evolution of the legal framework for market studies in Mexican competition law, and the
outcomes of some of the market studies).
39. Id. at 6.
40. Gabriel Castañedo Gallardo, Orígenes, Avances y Dificultades de la Política de Competencia en
México (1993–2004), in 3 EL NUEVO MILENIO MEXICANO: EL CAMBIO ESTRUCTURAL 337, 369
(Pascual García Alba Iduñate, Lucino Gutiérrez Herrera, & Gabriela Torres Ramírez eds., 2004).
41. Jorge L. Velázquez Roa, Competition Policy and Regulatory Reform in Mexico, 4 INT’L J. PUB.

AYDIN (DO NOT DELETE)

162

12/9/2016 1:47 PM

LAW AND CONTEMPORARY PROBLEMS

[Vol. 79: 155

opinions on federal programs and policies—though its opinion can still be vetoed
by the President of the Republic.42
E. Fostering A Competition Culture
Progress in the FCC’s advocacy efforts aimed at fostering a competition
culture among economic actors and the public at large has been the result of a
gradual learning process, rather than due to legislative reforms. Early on, the
FCC was criticized for not devoting sufficient attention to its communication with
the public.43 However, it has been able to turn this around not only by focusing
enforcement on cases with significant impact on consumers, but also by devoting
resources to communicating the benefits of its activities more effectively to the
public.44 As a consequence of their advocacy activities, the FCC and the
COFECE have increased references to competition law and policy on the public
agenda.45 Awareness of competition law among businesses has grown, and many
more law and economic consultancy firms specializing in competition have
sprung.46
F. Advancing Political And Economic Freedom
The Mexican competition regime has arguably made only a modest
contribution to advancing political and economic freedom in the country, and
improvements in this area have been slow. One way a competition regime can
help advance economic freedom in a country is by tackling economic
concentration in national markets. Initially the FCC had few tools to address
existing monopolies.47 In 2006, the FCC was granted the power to restructure
monopolies; however, progress on this front has been meager, with few large
firms effectively dominating national markets in sectors such as
telecommunications, beer, cement, and broadcasting.48 Dominant firms in the
media sector are particularly problematic for political freedom, as these firms

POL’Y 100, 106 (2009).
42. Decreto por el que se reforman, adicionan, y derogan diversas disposiciones de la Ley Federal
de Competencia Económica [LFCE] [Federal Competition Law] art. 24, pfo. 6, Diario Oficial de
la Federación [DOF] 28-6-2006 (Mex.).
43. OECD 1998, supra note 3, at 29; Julius Cavendish, Among the Oligopolists, GLOB.
COMPETITION REV. (Feb. 1, 2007), http://globalcompetitionreview.com/news/article/1215/amongoligopolists/ [https://perma.cc/SG5V-9GAZ].
44. Angel López Hoher, Competition Advocacy in Mexico: Lessons from the Past Decade, 8 CPI
ANTITRUST CHRON., no. 2, 2012, at 2, 3.
45. Id. at 3–4.
46. Julius Cavendish, Tequila Sunrise, GLOB. COMPETITION REV (Feb. 1, 2007),
http://globalcompetitionreview.com/features/article/1216/tequila-sunrise/
[https://perma.cc/8QTPASFJ].
47. OECD 1998, supra note 3 at 12–13.
48. Busting the Cartels: Mexico’s Competition Policy, ECONOMIST (Mar. 4, 2010),
http://www.economist.com/node/15610165 [https://perma.cc/4TT7-F7KH].
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may—and have been known to—control access to political campaigning in
Mexico.49
To summarize, Mexican competition law and policy cannot be characterized
as an unqualified success with respect to all the objectives that are attributed to
competition law and policy in developing countries. Legislative and
constitutional reforms, as well as gradual institutional learning, improved the
effectiveness of the system on many fronts, but on others such as advancing
political and economic freedom, progress has been meager. The trajectory of the
Mexican competition regime resembles a gradual upward slope among the
trajectories of competition regimes identified by Kovacic and Lopez-Galdos in
this symposium.50
III
MEXICO’S ROCKY ROAD TO THE FEDERAL LAW ON ECONOMIC
COMPETITION IN 1992
After nearly fifty years of developmental policies aimed at protecting and
fostering its domestic market, in the 1980s Mexico embarked on a route towards
free trade and domestic liberalization following the debt crisis of 1982.51 High
inflation and a sharp fall in real wages—over seven percent, on average, annually
from 1983 through 198852—led the Mexican government under President Miguel
de la Madrid (1982 through 1988) to embark on an ambitious program of
economic reforms, which continued to deepen under the presidency of Carlos
Salinas (1988 through 1994).53 The first phase of Mexican reforms focused mostly
on structural adjustment. The administration slashed the government budget,
radically devalued the peso, eliminated subsidies, and reduced public employees’
wages.54 By the mid-1980s, it launched deeper institutional reforms such as
privatization, deregulation and regulatory reform, and trade liberalization.
Mexico entered the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade in 1986.55 In 1991,
the Mexican administration announced that it would start negotiations with the
United States and Canada for NAFTA.56 The negotiations started in 1991 and
were concluded in 1993, and the agreement came into force in 1994.57
This is the context in which the first modern Mexican competition law was
49. Gustavo Flores-Macías, Mexico’s 2012 Elections: The Return of the PRI, 24 J. DEMOCRACY 128,
136 (2013).
50. William E. Kovacic & Marianela Lopez-Galdos, Lifecycles of Competition Systems: Explaining
Variation in the Implementation of New Regimes, 79 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS., no. 4., 2016, at 116–17.
51. NORA LUSTIG, MEXICO: THE REMAKING OF AN ECONOMY 28 (1998).
52. Nora Lustig, The 1982 Debt Crisis, Chiapas, NAFTA, and Mexico’s Poor, CHALLENGE, Mar.–
Apr. 1995, at 45, 46.
53. LUSTIG, supra note 51, at 29.
54. SARAH BABB, MANAGING MEXICO: ECONOMISTS FROM NATIONALISM TO NEOLIBERALISM
179 (2001).
55. Id. at 181.
56. FREDERICK W. MAYER, INTERPRETING NAFTA: THE SCIENCE AND ART OF POLITICAL
ANALYSIS 49–50 (1998).
57. MAXWELL A. CAMERON & BRIAN W. TOMLIN, THE MAKING OF NAFTA xi-xiv (2000).
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adopted in December of 1992.58 The history of competition legislation in Mexico
goes back to the prohibition of monopolies in the constitution of 1857.59 The
Mexican Constitution of 1917 likewise included a ban on monopolies in addition
to provisions against cartels and abuses of dominance, but these provisions were
not enforced due to the absence of implementing regulations.60 The 1934 Organic
Law of Monopolies was likewise ineffective.61 In practice, until the end of the
1980s, many businesses were shielded from competition through the chambers of
commerce, industry, or by some level of government.62 The degree of economic
concentration in the economy was high. In 1992, twenty-five companies
accounted for 47.1% of Mexican GDP.63
A number of officials from the Economic Deregulation Unit at the Secretary
of Commerce and Industrial Development became convinced of the necessity of
adopting a competition law during the broad institutional reform agenda of the
1980s.64 These officials perceived competition law as an antidote to collusion
among large firms, as a counterweight to state-owned monopolies, and as a
defense of consumers and firms in the regulated sectors of the economy in which
regulators had become unduly close to regulated interests.65 The expectation was
that the law would not only promote competition in the marketplace, but could
also reduce state intervention in the economy.
In the meantime, progress in negotiations with the United States and Canada
gave an external impetus for the adoption of a competition law, as NAFTA
committed the signing parties to the adoption of national measures proscribing
anti-competitive business conduct.66 The biggest objections to the law came from
different parts of the government,67 but the level of interest and support from the
public and the business community was also low.68 Potential opposition from
business was muted by the fact that business associations were supportive of
NAFTA in general.69 Likewise, businesses were much more preoccupied with
negotiations about tariffs and quotas than they were focused on competition
58. Ley Federal de Competencia Económica [LFCE] [Federal Competition Law], Diario Oficial de
la Federación [DOF] 24-12-1992 (Mex.).
59. Omar Guerrero Rodriguez & Alan Ramírez, Pursuit of Effective Antitrust Enforcement:
Mexico’s Case, in ANNUAL PROCEEDINGS OF THE FORDHAM COMPETITION LAW INSTITUTE:
INTERNATIONAL ANTITRUST LAW AND POLICY 387, 389 (Barry E. Hawk ed., 2013).
60. Rafael del Villar & Javier Soto Alvarez, Logros y dificultades de la Politica de Competencia
Económica en México, 821 INFORMACIÓN COMERCIAL ESPAÑOLA 107, 108 (2005).
61. Joshua A. Newberg, Mexico’s New Economic Competition Law: Toward the Development of a
Mexican Law of Antitrust, 31 COLUM. J. TRANSNAT’L. L. 587, 587 (1993).
62. Marcos Avalos, Condiciones Generales de Competencia: El Caso de Mexico, 48 CEPAL SERIE
ESTUDIOS Y PERSPECTIVAS 1, 10 (2006).
63. Newberg, supra note 61, at 603.
64. Avalos, supra note 62, at 10.
65. Id.
66. Gabriel Castañeda Gallardo, Antitrust Enforcement in Mexico 1993–1995 and its Prospects, 4
U.S.–MEX. L.J. 19, 21 n.8 (1996).
67. Avalos, supra note 62, at 11.
68. OECD 1998, supra note 3, at 5; Castañeda Gallardo, supra note 40, at 344.
69. Schneider, supra note 16, at 102.
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law.70 The process resulted in the adoption of the FLEC in December 1992, and
the establishment of the FCC in June 1993.
IV
THE FEDERAL LAW ON ECONOMIC COMPETITION (1992)
The FLEC71 includes provisions against cartels and abuses of dominant
positions, and allows for merger review and competition advocacy. The FLEC
classifies potentially anti-competitive practices as either absolute or relative.
Absolute monopolistic practices are what are referred to in most other
jurisdictions as “hard-core cartels,” or agreements between competitors on price,
output, market division, and bid rigging. These practices are prohibited per se.72
Relative monopolistic practices are what would be treated under monopoly or
abuse of dominance provisions in other jurisdictions. Some of these were
specified in the law, such as resale price maintenance, tied sales, exclusive
dealing, and refusals to deal, whereas others could be reached by an open-ended
provision that defined “any conduct that unduly damages, or impairs the
competitive process and free access to production, processing, distribution and
marketing of goods and services” as anti-competitive.73 The explicit list of relative
monopolistic practices has been extended in subsequent reforms of the FLEC as
a reaction to a Supreme Court decision in 2005 that declared the provision
unconstitutional for failing to establish the parameters that the FCC must
observe to sanction the relative monopolistic practices involved.74
Under the 1992 FLEC, the FCC did not have the power to restructure a
monopolized industry.75 Similarly, the FLEC did not address monopolistic
pricing.76 Regulators could have used sector-specific regulations to control
abusive pricing practices by dominant firms, but the FCC first had to identify the
firm as having market power in a sector before the regulator could step in to
address the conduct in question.
The FLEC prohibits any merger whose objective or effect is to reduce, distort,
or hinder competition.77 All mergers that go beyond a certain threshold in terms
of sales or assets require notification to the FCC/COFECE.78 In assessing
mergers, the FLEC requires the FCC/COFECE to consider whether the merging
70. Castañeda Gallardo, supra note 40, at 346.
71. Ley Federal de Competencia Económica [LFCE] [Federal Competition Law], Diario Oficial de
la Federación [DOF] 24-12-1992 (Mex.).
72. Id. at arts. 8, 9.
73. Id. at art. 10, pfo. 7.
74. Eduardo Pérez Motta & Heidi Sada Correa, Competition Policy in Mexico, in BUILDING NEW
COMPETITION LAW REGIMES 3, 11 (David Lewis ed., 2013); Ana Elena Fierro & Adriana Garcia, Guía
de las decisiones del PJF en materia de competencia económica: Cómo generar una cultura de competencia
17 (Centro de Investigación y Docencia Económica, Documentos de Trabajo 31, 2008).
75. OECD 1998, supra note 3, at 12.
76. Id.
77. Ley Federal de Competencia Económica [LFCE] [Federal Competition Law] art. 16, Diario
Oficial de la Federación [DOF] 24-12-1992 (Mex.).
78. Id. at art. 20.
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parties would be able to fix prices unilaterally, substantially restrict competitors’
access to the market, or engage in unlawful monopolistic conduct.79 The
FCC/COFECE must identify the relevant market and determine market power
to analyze the mergers.80
The FLEC recognizes the possibility that the state itself or state-owned
enterprises can commit anti-competitive actions. State-owned enterprises are
subject to the FLEC’s provisions on relative and absolute monopolistic practices,
except in areas of “strategic concern” as defined by Article 28 of the Mexican
Constitution.81 Other than these exceptions, the FLEC applies to all economic
actors, public or private. The FLEC empowers the FCC to give its opinion—
which until the 2006 reforms was non-binding—on the effects that existing
legislation, regulations, and administrative acts of state organs may have on
competition.82 Upon request by the Federal Executive, the FCC may also give its
opinion on the effects of competition on new laws and regulations proposed to
the Congress.83 The FCC/COFECE participate in inter-ministerial committees in
order to inject competition policy principles into regulatory decisions, and
therefore have been involved in policymaking about privatization, licensing,
standards, sector regulation, and foreign trade.84
The FLEC empowered the FCC, which became operational in 1993, to
enforce its provisions.85 The FCC was attached in budgetary terms to the
Secretary of Commerce and Industrial Development,86 but otherwise was
technically and administratively independent.87 Moreover, the Secretary could
not intervene in the decisions of the FCC, unlike sector regulators such as the
Federal Commission for Telecommunications (COFETEL) whose decisions had
to be approved by the Ministry of Telecommunications and Transport.88 The
decisionmaking body in the FCC was a plenum of five commissioners appointed
by the President for staggered ten-year terms, which made decisions by a majority
79. Id. at art. 17.
80. Id. at art. 18.
81. Article 28 of the Mexican Constitution lists the following as sectors of strategic concern: the
postal system, telegraphs, and radiotelegraphy; radioactive minerals and generation of nuclear energy;
the planning and control of the national electric system, as well as the public service of transmission and
distribution of electric energy; and the exploration and extraction of oil and other hydrocarbons.
Constitución Política de los Estados Unidos Méxicanos, CP, art. 28, Diario Oficial de la Federación [DO]
03-2-1983 (Mex.), últimas reformas DOF 20-12-2013 (Mex.).
82. Ley Federal de Competencia Económica [LFCE] [Federal Competition Law] art. 24, Diario
Oficial de la Federación [DOF] 24-12-1992 (Mex.).
83. Id.
84. OECD 1998, supra note 3, at 25.
85. Ley Federal de Competencia Económica [LFCE] [Federal Competition Law] arts. 23, 24, Diario
Oficial de la Federación [DOF] 24-12-1992 (Mex.).
86. OECD 2004, supra note 4, at 36.
87. Ley Federal de Competencia Económica [LFCE] [Federal Competition Law] art. 23, Diario
Oficial de la Federación [DOF] 24-12-1992 (Mex.).
88. Roger G. Noll, Priorities for Telecommunications Reform in Mexico, in NO GROWTH WITHOUT
EQUITY? INEQUALITY, INTERESTS AND COMPETITION IN MEXICO 365, 380 (Santiago Levy & Michael
Walton eds., 2009).
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vote.89 The general impression is that the FCC was for the most part able to
protect its independence from the Executive and other state agencies even before
the 2013 constitutional amendments that reconstituted it as an independent
agency.90 It was also able to remain relatively free from the influence of big
business compared to sector regulators such as the COFETEL.91
V
IMPEDIMENTS TO EFFECTIVE ENFORCEMENT IN THE INITIAL YEARS
(1993–2006)
The framing article of this symposium describes how various conditions in
developing countries may prevent competition agencies in those countries from
effectively implementing competition laws and engaging in competition
advocacy.92 Some of those conditions have been less of an issue in Mexico than
in poorer countries. For instance, recruiting staff with technical expertise has
mostly not been a significant obstacle,93 except in some areas such as mergers that
require complex economic analysis.94 Budgetary resources were a more serious
concern in the initial years, especially after the tightening of government
spending due to the financial crisis—the agency budget fell about thirty percent
in real terms between 1994 and 1997.95 Concerns with the budget continued into
the mid-2000s.96 An inadequate budget can be an important obstacle to the
effectiveness of any agency, but a generous budget allocation is not a sufficient
condition for agency success. In fact, there is evidence that in its initial years the
FCC punched below its weight in terms of efficiency for the level of budgetary
resources it had.97 The following factors have impeded the effectiveness of the
Mexican competition regime.
A. Legislation
Some obstacles to the effectiveness of competition policy in the early years
were due to the provisions of the FLEC itself and the powers it granted to the
FCC. The FLEC did not allow the FCC to restructure monopolies. It quickly
became clear, however, that lacking the power to address structural monopolies
could be problematic in a country like Mexico with a highly concentrated

89. Ley Federal de Competencia Económica [LFCE] [Federal Competition Law] arts. 25, 26, Diario
Oficial de la Federación [DOF] 24-12-1992 (Mex.).
90. GCR 2002, supra note 26, at 34; OECD 1998, supra note 3, at 18.
91. Isabel Guerrero, Luis F. López-Calva & Michael Walton, The Inequality Trap and Its Links to
Low Growth in Mexico, in NO GROWTH WITHOUT EQUITY? INEQUALITY, INTERESTS AND
COMPETITION IN MEXICO, supra note 88, at 111, 126, 153.
92. Aydin & Büthe, supra note 19, at 15–26.
93. COMISIÓN FEDERAL DE COMPETENCIA, INFORME DE COMPETENCIA ECONÓMICA 2003, 20
(2003); OECD 2004, supra note 4, at 53–54.
94. OECD 2004, supra note 4, at 54.
95. OECD 1998, supra note 3, at 21.
96. OECD 2004, supra note 4, at 64–65.
97. Dalkir, supra note 24, at 239–40.
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economic structure. Moreover, early privatization programs did not have the
intended effect of breaking up structural monopolies; they sometimes merely
transformed a public monopoly into a private one,98 the notable example being
the telecommunications giant Télefonos de México (Telmex). The public
monopoly Telmex was sold as a package to a single investor, rather than being
broken up, in order to maximize state revenues.99 Furthermore, the government
offered significant tax reductions and an effective monopoly for five years after
the privatization to sweeten the deal.100 Neither the FCC nor the sector regulator
had been established at the time of the privatization of Telmex, and once
established they had few powers to deal with it.
The division of responsibilities between sector regulators and the FCC in
terms of dealing with relative monopolistic practices in regulated sectors also
proved problematic. Under the FLEC, the FCC was responsible for identifying
whether a firm had market power in a sector, but it was the sector regulator that
had the responsibility to address this behavior, without the FCC’s participation
in the negotiations or the preparation of regulations to deal with the anticompetitive conduct.101 This division of responsibilities became problematic if the
FCC found the firm to have significant market power, but the sector regulator
was too weak or had been captured by the actors whose behavior it was supposed
to regulate.102
The investigative powers granted to the FCC were also widely perceived to
be inadequate.103 The FCC did not have the power to conduct dawn raids—
unannounced searches in company headquarters to gather information and
evidence—before 2011, a power which would have improved its chances of
collecting meaningful evidence in cartel cases. Nor could the FCC initially count
on a leniency program to help its efforts to combat cartels. Moreover, the fines it
could impose—and effectively collect—were not adequate to deter firms from
engaging in anti-competitive conduct.104 Prior to the 2011 reforms, The Economist
commented that it was profitable for firms to cheat even if caught.105

98. Noll, supra note 88, at 369.
99. Rafael del Villar, Competition and Equity in Telecommunications, in NO GROWTH WITHOUT
EQUITY? INEQUALITY, INTERESTS AND COMPETITION IN MEXICO, supra note 88, at 321, 323.
100. See id. at 323–25 (noting that “[t]he government’s actions and omissions turned [Telmex] into
an extremely profitable quasi-monopoly and its owners into economically powerful people virtually
overnight.”).
101. OECD 1998, supra note 3, at 32; OECD 2004, supra note 4, at 34.
102. OECD 1998, supra note 3, at 32.
103. OECD 2004, supra note 4, at 65.
104. Clare Bolton, An Interview with Eduardo Perez Motta, GLOB. COMPETITION REV. (Feb. 1,
2007),
http://globalcompetitionreview.com/features/article/1220/an-interview-eduardo-perez-motta/
[https://perma.cc/U22P-UGMH].
105. ECONOMIST, supra note 48.
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B. The Judicial System
In addition to the provisions of the FLEC itself, significant obstacles to the
effective implementation of the competition law arose from various aspects of
the judicial system in Mexico. Under the 1992 FLEC, the parties to a competition
case had ample opportunity for judicial review if they were dissatisfied with the
FCC’s decisions.106 The first of these is the “amparo”—injunction—action,
established in Articles 103 to 107 of the Mexican Constitution.107 An amparo can
be claimed by anyone in the federal district courts on the grounds that he is being
subjected to an unconstitutional statute or that his due process rights are being
infringed.108 Firms could claim amparos challenging the FCC’s investigation, its
procedures, or its final decisions.109 If the courts decided an interlocutory
procedural amparo in favor of a firm, the FCC typically commenced a new
proceeding, against which the firm could file a new amparo.110 If a final FCC
decision was at issue, parties could request, and frequently obtained, a motion to
stay until the amparo review was complete.111 Amparo decisions could be
appealed to higher courts, and if the amparo request addressed the
constitutionality of a provision of the FLEC, then the appeal went straight to the
Supreme Court.112 While the FCC generally won in the Supreme Court with
respect to the constitutionality of its actions and of the law itself (with some
exceptions), the district courts were liberal in granting amparos.113
Designed to protect individuals’ due process rights, amparo claims came to
be used aggressively and in increasing numbers by private actors against the FCC,
which complicated competition law enforcement in various ways. They delayed
the FCC’s proceedings, because firms frequently filed multiple claims in different
districts or filed subsequent amparos throughout the proceedings.114 For instance,
after the FCC declared Telmex a dominant carrier in 1998—a necessary step for
the sector regulator COFETEL to step in and impose remedies—its decision was
stayed by a series of amparos, changes to its declaration, and further amparos,
until finally a court annulled the FCC’s decision in 2006 because the evidentiary
basis was outdated.115 Dealing with the amparos filed against it imposed
significant strains on the agency’s resources. According to the FCC, until 2003,
one out of eight of its investigations was subject to an amparo, and more than half
of the merger investigations were subject to amparos.116 The OECD reported in

106.
107.
108.
109.
110.
111.
112.
113.
114.
115.
116.

OECD 2004, supra note 4, at 44.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 45.
Id. at 44–45.
COMISIÓN FEDERAL DE COMPETENCIA, supra note 93, at 17; OECD 2004, supra note 4, at 45.
Sánchez Ugarte, supra note 35, at 120.
Noll, supra note 88, at 382.
Sánchez Ugarte, supra note 35, at 118.
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2004 that the lawyers in the Legal Affairs Directorate of the FCC devoted forty
percent of their time to dealing with amparo cases.117
In addition to amparos, if an FCC decision imposed a fine, a company could
seek judicial relief through an appeal to the Federal Court of Fiscal and
Administrative Justice (Tribunal Federal de Justicia Fiscal y Administrativa).
This court normally reviews tax cases, but it asserts jurisdiction to review any
agency action that involves the imposition of a monetary payment obligation on
a private party, and thus has reviewed a growing number of cases in which the
FCC imposed fines.118 The FCC lost a number of these cases on the grounds that
its orders imposing fines were not adequately justified.119
Even if an FCC decision imposing fines was confirmed after amparos and at
the Federal Court of Fiscal and Administrative Justice, collection still proved
difficult. Until the 2006 reforms, the fines imposed by the FCC were collected by
the treasuries of municipal authorities, but this system was ineffective because
the municipalities had few incentives to collect.120 Due to judicial and procedural
intricacies, the FCC was able to collect only 9.5 percent of all the fines it imposed
between 1997 through 2002, with 18.5 percent revoked or lost on judicial review,
and seventy-two percent remaining uncollected.121 The inability to collect fines,
or collection after years of delay while fines were decimated by inflation,
significantly reduced the deterrent effect of FCC’s decisions.
In addition to the judicial review procedures that became powerful tools in
the hands of companies to prevent or delay enforcement, some broader concerns
about the functioning of the Mexican judicial system impeded successful
competition law enforcement in its first decade. The unfamiliarity of the district
courts with substantive antitrust issues was one of them. In its early years, the
FCC saw many of its decisions reversed at the district courts, mostly on
procedural grounds.122 In addition to being unfamiliar with competition policy
issues, judges were inexperienced in applying a statute as short and non-specific
as the FLEC, because the civil law model in Mexico has historically involved
detailed legislation.123 Thus, by ruling adversely against the FCC on procedural
grounds, “the court can send the case back to the [FCC] and avoids resolving the
antitrust question.”124 Judges’ lack of specialized knowledge in antitrust has been
a problem in many developing countries with young competition regimes,125 and

117. OECD 2004, supra note 4, at 54
118. Id. at 46.
119. Id.
120. Bolton, supra note 104.
121. OECD 2004, supra note 4, at 47; see also Sánchez Ugarte, supra note 35, at 121–22 (on the
difficulty of collecting fines imposed by the FCC).
122. OECD 2004, supra note 4, at 45.
123. Id.
124. Id.
125. See INT’L COMPETITION NETWORK, COMPETITION AND THE JUDICIARY: 2ND. PHASE – CASE
STUDIES 17 (2007) (reporting that for the surveyed countries “lack of specialized knowledge on
competition issues by the judiciary is an important issue affecting competition policy implementation”).
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establishing specialized courts—like Mexico did in 2013—can be a way to
alleviate this problem.126
Questions have also been raised about the capacity of Mexico’s judicial
system to resist outside pressures, such as those coming from big business.127 An
empirical analysis of amparos requested in competition cases reveals that
companies directly or indirectly controlled by billionaires were more likely to
secure an amparo from courts compared to other firms.128 These results support
the claim that concentrated business interests have undue influence in the
Mexican judicial system. This does not necessarily mean that the judicial system
is corrupt—though it may be—as big business also commands significant
resources to hire the best law firms to defend itself. The OECD has stated,
“[t]here is some belief in the private sector that the Commission is simply
outgunned in amparo cases and cannot match the legal resources arrayed against
it.”129 The FCC’s annual budget was equal to two days’ worth of profits by Telmex
and RadioMóvil Dipsa or Telcel,130 the two big companies that dominate the
landline and cellular phone markets in Mexico, both controlled by Carlos Slim.131
Proceedings delayed by series of amparos, decisions frequently overturned by
district courts, and failure to impose or collect fines not only diluted the impact
of the FCC’s enforcement efforts, but may have also weakened the image of the
FCC in the eyes of the Mexican public. The OECD observed in 1998 that the
FCC had started acting cautiously as a reaction to the aggressive court cases filed
by private actors, and that this had led to a perception that the FCC was weak.132
C. Weak Competition Culture
Another one of the key impediments to the effectiveness of competition
policy in Mexico—and in other developing countries—is the lack of genuine
support for competition policy among companies, state organs, and the public, or
more broadly the lack of a competition culture.133 Lack of awareness of and
support for competition law lowers compliance by economic actors, and thus
detracts from efforts to establish an effective competition policy. It is more costly
to elicit compliance with a law for which public acceptance is low. Awareness of
and support for the law could trigger more and better complaints about anticompetitive conduct, less tolerance for abuses of the law, and overall greater
political support or pressure for its enforcement. For these reasons, some experts
126. ELEANOR FOX & DANIEL CRANE, GLOBAL ISSUES IN ANTITRUST AND COMPETITION LAW
423–24 (2010).
127. Guerrero, López-Calva & Walton, supra note 91, at 126–27.
128. Id. at 129.
129. OECD 2004, supra note 4, at 54.
130. del Villar, supra note 99, at 334.
131. Dolia Estevez, Mexico Cracks Down On Billionaires Carlos Slim’s And Emilio Azcarraga’s
Telecom Monopolies, FORBES (Dec. 9, 2013), http://www.forbes.com/sites/doliaestevez/2013/12/09
/mexicos-two-telecom-giants-under-threat-of-being-declared-monopolies/#643f391642a4.
132. OECD 1998, supra note 3, at 30.
133. Velázquez Roa, supra note 41, at 108.
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suggest an emphasis on educating the public and state actors about competition
policy rather than traditional competition enforcement in developing country
contexts.134
In Mexico, in the initial years after the adoption of the competition law, many
private, state, and municipal actors continued to operate according to the prereform formal and informal rules of the game.135 For example, the National Road
Transport Chamber continued to set minimum prices in transport,136 and
municipal authorities sanctioned market-sharing agreements among tortilla
producers in the municipality of Carillo Puerto.137 They may have done so not
only because they benefited from the existing system, but perhaps also because
they did not know enough about competition law or had not internalized it.
Similarly, the broader public was unaware of the law and its potential benefits; it
was not generally supportive of the idea of competition as an organizing principle
of the economy even after ten years of competition enforcement.138 Few among
the public knew much about the FCC and what it did: a survey commissioned by
the FCC in 2009 showed that only one percent of Mexicans knew which state
authority promoted competition among firms.139 Moreover, the competition law
was perceived as being a product of the Salinas presidency, or a requirement
imposed by NAFTA, which further reduced the support for the law and the FCC
in the early years.140
Notwithstanding these impediments to effective enforcement, the FCC also
had some early successes that helped raise its profile among the economic actors
and the public at large, which contributed to its later success. The FCC’s
challenges to state-sanctioned anti-competitive barriers “provided immense
publicity and quantifiable results for the agency”; for instance, when it sided with
the foreign competitors’ interests in penetrating the Mexican long-distance
telecommunications market, or when it challenged Pemex, the national oil
company, on its control of service station concessions.141 Moreover, the FCC’s
investigations in the initial years focused on sectors such as milk, tortillas, soft
drinks, credit cards, and transport services, with a tangible and potentially large
impact on consumers, though it was not always successful in these efforts.142

134. Armando E. Rodriguez, The Lessons of Mexico’s Antitrust Initiative, in COMPETITION POLICY,
DEREGULATION, AND MODERNIZATION IN LATIN AMERICA 117, 133 (Moisés Naím & Joseph S.
Tulchin eds., 1999).
135. OECD 1998, supra note 3, at 30; Julius Cavendish, Among the Oligopolists. GLOB.
COMPETITION REVIEW (Feb. 2007).
136. Id. at 10.
137. COMISIÓN FEDERAL DE COMPETENCIA, INFORME ANUAL 53 (1997).
138. OECD 2004, supra note 4, at 12.
139. COMISIÓN FEDERAL DE COMPETENCIA ECONÓMICO, WORKING TOGETHER FOR A
COMPETITION CULTURE 9 (2015).
140. OECD 2004, supra note 4, at 12.
141. Rodriguez, supra note 134, at 135.
142. COMISIÓN FEDERAL DE COMPETENCIA, supra note 93, at 15.
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VI
REFORMS TO THE MEXICAN COMPETITION REGIME
Reforms to the competition law in 2006 and 2011, constitutional amendments
in 2013, as well as the competition law that replaced the FLEC in 2014 all
addressed some of the problems that impeded the effectiveness of the Mexican
competition regime.
A. Legislative Changes
The loopholes or weaknesses in the FLEC were addressed through a number
of reforms starting in 2006. With respect to abuses of dominance, the 2006 reform
allowed the FCC to impose structural remedies such as divestitures in monopoly
cases,143 and expanded the list of relative monopolistic conditions listed in the
Article 10 of the 1992 FLEC.144 These changes allow the FCC/COFECE to better
deal with abuses of dominance.
The 2006 and 2011 reforms considerably strengthened the FCC’s investigative
powers, especially against cartels. The 2006 reform introduced a leniency
program, which reduced penalties for firms that provided evidence in cartel cases,
in the hopes of increasing the likelihood that cartel members would cooperate
with the authorities.145 The 2011 reform gave the FCC the power to conduct dawn
raids, which are particularly useful tools for collecting evidence in cartel cases.146
Before the 2011 reform, the FCC could visit companies to gather evidence, but
these visits had to be announced beforehand, which gave the investigated firms
the opportunity to hide or destroy evidence. The FCC’s fight against cartels was
further reinforced by expanding the scope for criminal prosecution against
individuals in cartel cases. The reforms also strengthened the FCC’s deterrent
power by increasing maximum fines from $7 million to ten percent of the firm’s
annual revenues in Mexico. The 2006 reform made the federal tax authorities,
rather than municipal authorities, responsible for collecting the fines imposed by
the FCC, and the collected fines are used for a program to promote small and
medium sized enterprises.147 This was expected to increase the efficiency of
collection of the fines, though problems still remain on this front.148

143. Decreto por el que se reforman, adicionan, y derogan diversas disposiciones de la Ley Federal
de Competencia Económica [LFCE] [Federal Competition Law] art. 37, Diario Oficial de la Federación
[DOF] 28-6-2006 (Mex.).
144. Id. at art. 10, pfo. VII–XI.
145. Id. at art. 33 bis 3.
146. Decreto por el que se reforman, adicionan y derogan diversas disposiciones de la Ley Federal
de Competencia Económica [LFCE] [Federal Competition Law], del Código Penal Federal y del Código
Fiscal de la Federación, art. 31, Diario Oficial de la Federación [DOF] 10-5-2011 (Mex.); ORG. FOR
ECON. CO-OPERATION & DEV. [OECD], ANNUAL REPORT ON COMPETITION POLICY
DEVELOPMENTS IN MEXICO: 2011 4 (2012) [hereinafter OECD 2011].
147. Bolton, supra note 120.
148. Verónica Gascón, Sancionan, pero no cobran, REFORMA: NEGOCIOS (Nov. 28, 2014),
http://www.reforma.com/aplicacioneslibre/articulo/default.aspx?id=404897&md5=923d2ec0ffb2c71d96e
151078b4f49bd&ta=0dfdbac11765226904c16cb9ad1b2efe&po=4 [https://perma.cc/QH7Q-YCMS].
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The 2011 reform granted the FCC the power to settle with parties while the
investigation is ongoing, whereas before it could only come to a settlement after
it concluded its investigation.149 This allows the FCC/COFECE more flexibility
in settling cases, and helps avoid lengthy investigations and potential court
proceedings. The FCC was also granted the power to issue interim measures, by
which it can oblige firms to cease alleged anti-competitive conduct while an
investigation is carried out.150 Finally, class actions for damages in competition
cases were allowed.151 President Calderón’s initial reform proposal also included
political autonomy for the FCC and even higher fines, but these provisions were
eliminated or watered down in the congressional committees.152
The competition regime in Mexico saw its most fundamental reforms in 2013
and 2014. Constitutional amendments in 2013 changed the legal status of the
FCC, reconstituting it as a legally independent entity under the Mexican
Constitution.153 The amendments increased the number of commissioners in the
plenum from five to seven, and made their selection process more transparent
and independent of the Executive.154 They created an evaluation committee that
is responsible for presenting the candidates, who then must be approved by the
Senate.155 The 2013 amendments also created IFETEL to replace the
telecommunications sector regulator COFETEL, along with reforms that
removed the limits on foreign ownership in telecommunications.156 IFETEL is
constitutionally independent, like the COFECE, and is responsible for
competition matters in telecommunications and broadcasting.157 The
commissioners of IFETEL are selected by the same method as the COFECE
commissioners.158 The new FLEC adopted in 2014 creates an investigation unit
within the COFECE in order to separate investigative authority from
decisionmaking authority, a change that had been demanded by practitioners for
149. OECD 2011, supra note 146, at 4.
150. Id.
151. Decreto por el que se reforman y adicionan el Co digo Federal de Procedimientos Civiles, el
Co digo Civil Federal, la Ley Federal de Competencia Econo mica, la Ley Federal de Proteccio n al
Consumidor, la Ley Orga nica del Poder Judicial de la Federacio n, la Ley General del Equilibrio
Ecolo gico y la Proteccio n al Ambiente y la Ley de Proteccio n y Defensa al Usuario de Servicios
Financieros, arts. 578–625, Diario Oficial de la Federación [DOF] 30-8-2011 (Mex.).
152. Aprueban en comisiones ley de competencia, EL ECONOMISTA (Apr. 28, 2010),
http://eleconomista.com.mx/sociedad/2010/04/28/aprueban-comisiones-ley-competencia
[https://perma.cc/3FGU-Z5ZV].
153. Decreto por el que se reforman y adicionan diversas disposiciones de los arti culos 6o., 7o., 27,
28, 73, 78, 94 y 105 de la Constitucio n Poli tica de los Estados Unidos Mexicanos, en materia de
telecomunicaciones, art. 28, Diario Oficial de la Federación [DOF] 11-6-2013 (Mex.).
154. Id.
155. Id.
156. Decreto por el que se reforman y adicionan diversas disposiciones de los arti culos 6o., 7o., 27,
28, 73, 78, 94 y 105 de la Constitucio n Poli tica de los Estados Unidos Mexicanos, en materia de
telecomunicaciones, art. 28, transitorio quinto, Diario Oficial de la Federación [DOF] 11-6-2013 (Mex.).
157. Decreto por el que se reforman y adicionan diversas disposiciones de los arti culos 6o., 7o., 27,
28, 73, 78, 94 y 105 de la Constitucio n Poli tica de los Estados Unidos Mexicanos, en materia de
telecomunicaciones, art. 28, Diario Oficial de la Federación [DOF] 11-6-2013 (Mex.).
158. Id.
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some time.159 This separation increases the procedural fairness of competition
proceedings.
Legislative reforms have been coupled with greater political backing for the
COFECE, which is evidenced by increases in its budget and staff numbers. It has
enjoyed a boost to its budget of thirty-two percent for 2014 and sixty percent for
2015.160 It has also grown impressively in terms of staff numbers compared to a
decade earlier: In September 2015, its personnel totalled 359, more than double
the staff number than in September 2003, addressing the issue of understaffing
that had been a problem in the earlier years.161
B. The Judiciary
The 2013 reform established specialized courts to oversee appeals of
COFECE and IFETEL decisions; that is, competition law, telecommunications,
and broadcasting decisions.162 The amparo requests in these areas are also
resolved by these specialized courts. These developments mean that appeals and
amparos in competition cases are now considered by judges specialized and
experienced in competition matters, and also that judicial proceedings may take
less time to conclude due to their separation from the rest of the judicial system
and delay in the dockets, both of which have the potential to ameliorate some of
the earlier problems. Another important change is that COFECE resolutions are
not subject to a judicial stay pending the outcome of litigation.163
In addition to the legislative changes that addressed some of the problems
arising from amparos, judicial inexperience, and backlog, both the FCC and the
judiciary have experienced a learning process that has led to significant
improvements in the relationship between the two. The FCC learned from its
procedural mistakes of earlier years, began to hire more lawyers, and improved
its legal reasoning.164 The judiciary participated in a training program jointly
organized by the Federal Trade Commission and the Institute of the Federal
Judiciary (Instituto de Judicatura Federal), in which U.S. judges experienced in
antitrust matters held workshops to train Mexican judges.165
The legislative changes and the training programs have borne fruit: the FCC
and COFECE have gradually improved their success rate at the courts, and

159. Guerrero Rodriguez & Ramírez, supra note 59, at 403–404.
160. GLOB. COMPETITION REV., Mexico’s Federal Economic Competition Commission, in RATING
ENFORCEMENT 2014 (2014) [hereinafter GCR 2014]; GCR 2015, supra note 9.
161. COMISIÓN FEDERAL DE COMPETENCIA, supra note 93, at 20; COMISIÓN FEDERAL DE
COMPETENCIA ECONÓMICA, TERCER INFORME TRIMESTRAL 2015 70 (2015).
162. Decreto por el que se reforman y adicionan diversas disposiciones de los arti culos 6o., 7o., 27,
28, 73, 78, 94 y 105 de la Constitucio n Poli tica de los Estados Unidos Mexicanos, en materia de
telecomunicaciones, art. 28 pfo. VII, Diario Oficial de la Federación [DOF] 11-6-2013 (Mex.).
163. Id.
164. Not for attribution interviews, Washington, D.C (Mar. 25, 2015).
165. Eduardo Pérez Motta, International Antitrust: Recent Developments and Trends, in ANNUAL
PROCEEDINGS OF THE FORDHAM COMPETITION LAW INSTITUTE, supra note 59, at 319–20; not-forattribution interviews, Wash., D.C (Mar. 25, 2015).
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boasted a success rate of eighty one percent in 2013166 and ninety one percent in
2014,167 compared with about twenty five percent earlier in the 2000s.168 As a
former FCC official highlighted with respect to the FCC’s earlier dismal success
rate, improvements in the FCC/COFECE’s record in court is important not only
in strengthening enforcement efforts by making decisions that stick rather than
get overturned, but also in improving their credibility in the eyes of companies
who might be more willing to bring complaints.169
C. Competition Culture
The FCC/COFECE improved their efforts to foster a competition culture in
Mexico as a result of a gradual learning process rather than legislative reforms.
The OECD’s evaluation in 1998 and 2004 pointed to the lack of competition
culture as an important impediment to the effective enforcement of competition
law, and recommended that the FCC increase its advocacy efforts vis-à-vis the
public.170 The FCC and later the COFECE responded to these recommendations
by increasing their efforts to foster knowledge of and public support for the
competition law. They have established dialogues with the legal community and
business associations, developed a program aimed at small and medium-sized
businesses to increase awareness of competition law, and become more active in
promoting their work through public meetings and seminars.171 Realizing the
weakness of teaching and research on competition law, and economic laws in
general in Mexico,172 the FCC/COFECE have established alliances with
prestigious academic institutions such as Center for Research and Teaching in
Economics (Centro de Investigación y Docencia Económica) to offer a diploma
in “Economic Competition.”173 Also, the Commissioners and other public
officials from COFECE participate in teaching a course on competition in the
economics department of Universidad Nacional Autónoma de México, in
addition to giving seminars at various other universities.174
One of the central axes of the FCC’s and the COFECE’s communications
with the public has been framing competition policy issues in terms of their effects
on consumers. In 2008, for example, the FCC published a commissioned report—
frequently cited not only in its communications with the public, but also by
166. GCR 2014, supra note 160.
167. GCR 2015, supra note 9.
168. GLOB. COMPETITION REV., Mexico’s Federal Competition Commission, in RATING
ENFORCEMENT 2010 (2010).
169. Castañeda Gallardo, supra note 40, at 372.
170. OECD 1998, supra note 3, at 29–30, 33; OECD 2004, supra note 4, at 71–72.
171. ORG. FOR ECON. CO-OPERATION & DEV., PEER REVIEWS OF COMPETITION LAW AND
POLICY IN LATIN AMERICA: A FOLLOW-UP 34 (2007) [hereinafter OECD 2007].
172. Ricardo Garcia de la Rosa, New challenges for international Economic Law teaching and
research in Mexico: Mexico’s outstanding waves of reforms 14–16 (São Paulo Law School Fundação
Getulio Vargas—FGV DIREITO SP, Research Paper Series—Legal Studies, Paper No. 108, 2014).
173. COMISIÓN FEDERAL DE COMPETENCIA ECONÓMICA, CUARTO INFORME TRIMESTRAL 2015
46–49.
174. Id.
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politicians and international organizations such as the OECD and the World
Bank—that quantified the impact of anti-competitive practices on consumers in
Mexico.175
Some influential cartel and abuse of dominance cases have also been
important in demonstrating how the FCC’s and COFECE’s work benefits
consumers. In 2012, the FCC busted cartels involving tortillas (both at the
municipal and national levels), eggs, and poultry, all key products for Mexican
consumers, which put the FCC in the spotlight.176 Another headline-grabbing
decision involved abuse of dominance by Telcel, the dominant mobile carrier
owned by Carlos Slim, which was fined a record of $1 billion in 2011.177 The FCC
reversed this fine in 2012 upon commitments by the company to reduce its mobile
termination rates.178 While the decision to reverse the fine was seen as a setback
by some,179 the deal was expected to generate $6 billion a year in savings for
consumers.180 The FCC made sure that these benefits were communicated to
consumers.181
International observers have praised the recent reforms for modernizing and
bringing Mexican competition law and policy to international standards.
Nonetheless, some aspects of the reform—such as the new FLEC prohibition of
“barriers to competition,” or the power it granted to COFECE to regulate
“essential inputs”—were criticized for departing from international best
practices.182 Additionally, a number of practical issues in competition
enforcement arose in the aftermath of the reforms. The COFECE saw some
significant staff turnover. In the first year after the reforms, seven new
commissioners replaced the previous commission of five, and almost forty
percent of competition enforcers left, with a significant number moving to the

175. CARLOS M. URZÚA, EVALUACIÓN DE LOS EFECTOS DISTRIBUTIVOS Y ESPACIALES DE LAS
EMPRESAS CON PODER DE MERCADO EN MÉXICO (2008), http://189.206.114.205/images/stories/
transparencia/matriz_esudios_opiniones/carlos-urzua-efectos-sobre-el-bienestar-social-parte1.pdf
[https://perma.cc/MDX4-5DB2].
176. COMISIÓN FEDERAL DE COMPETENCIA, ANNUAL REPORT 2012 60 (2012).
177. Id. at 42; GLOB. COMPETITION REVIEW, Mexico’s Federal Competition Commission, in RATING
ENFORCEMENT 2012 (2012).
178. Stefano Berra, Mexico Cancels Record América Móvil Fine, GLOB. COMPETITION REV. (May
3, 2012), http://globalcompetitionreview.com/news/article/31749/mexico-cancels-record-america-movilfine/ [https://perma.cc/5FLE-E3FZ].
179. Id.
180. GLOB. COMPETITION REV., Mexico’s Federal Competition Commission, in RATING
ENFORCEMENT 2013 (2013).
181. Claudia Juárez Escalona, CFC le impone condiciones a Telcel, EL ECONOMISTA (May 3, 2012),
http://eleconomista.com.mx/industrias/2012/05/03/telcel-debera-cumplir-pacto-cfc
[https://perma.cc/K5K4-87D6].
182. For critiques, see generally Anne Perrot & Assimakis Komninos, Mexico’s Proposed Reform of
Competition Law: A Critique from Europe, 3 CPI ANTITRUST CHRON., Mar. 2014, at 1; Harry Phillips,
Barriers to Good Law, GLOB. COMPETITION REV. (Apr. 15, 2014), http://globalcompetitionreview.com
/features/article/35764/barriers-good-law/ [https://perma.cc/CR2C-K5BJ].
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newly established IFETEL.183 Another twenty-four percent left in 2014.184 The
COFECE was able to replace its staff; nonetheless, training the newly recruited
personnel has consumed the agency’s resources and left the agency with a rather
inexperienced enforcement team.185 This staff turnover and efforts at institution
building resulted in modest enforcement in 2014, and a slowing down of
investigations during this time of transition.186
VII
EXPLAINING THE RELATIVE SUCCESS OF THE MEXICAN COMPETITION
REGIME
Given the various impediments to the effective implementation of the
Mexican competition regime in the early years, the gradual strengthening of
Mexican competition law and policy, and the FCC and COFECE, is impressive.
The interplay of domestic and international factors has enabled the adoption
of a series of legislative and constitutional reforms starting in 2006, and also
motivated a series of internal improvements in the FCC. On the domestic front,
the pressure for legislative changes and internal reforms came from three sets of
actors: (1) consumers and consumer organizations; (2) think tanks, business
associations, and the bar association; and (3) domestic firms trying to break into
traditionally concentrated markets. Internationally, foreign firms trying to break
into the Mexican market and international organizations influenced the reform
process.
A. Domestic Factors
1. Consumers and Consumer Organizations
Consumers’ interest in more effective competition policy arises from its
potential to lower prices. The high costs of services provided by dominant firms
operating in network industries—such as telecommunications and
broadcasting—were one of the more visible signs of the concentrated economic
structure of Mexico.187 Mexican consumers pay more for telephone and
broadband internet services than consumers in other Latin American countries,
and the services they receive are of lower quality.188 While the example of
telecommunications is highly publicized, in reality many more sectors suffer from
low levels of competition, generating significant costs for consumers. For
instance, in 2010 the FCC busted a bid-rigging agreement between firms
providing insulin and other supplies to the healthcare system, which, according
183. GCR 2014, supra note 160.
184. GCR 2015, supra note 9.
185. GCR 2014, supra note 160.
186. GCR 2015, supra note 9.
187. ECONOMIST, supra note 48.
188. Slim’s Chances, ECONOMIST (Mar. 1, 2014), http://www.economist.com/news/business/
21597894-carlos-slim-faces-biggest-challenge-yet-his-dominance-telecoms-and-golden [https://perma.cc/
B45H-VL8Y].
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to some calculations, cost consumers $46 million between 2003 and 2006.189
Moreover, welfare losses from overcharging by firms with market power tend to
affect the poorest Mexican citizens and those in the rural sectors the most
seriously, contributing to the already high levels of inequality in the country.190
Former Chairman of the FCC Eduardo Perez Motta, who served from 2004
through 2013, says that reforms in telecommunications were possible because
“the Mexican people had become fed up with paying so much in phone
charges.”191 Such intense interests, however, do not necessarily result in collective
action that can push for change.192 Consumer interests are diffuse and hard to
mobilize. Moreover, they are frequently up against well-organized business
interests that have a stake in “weak and passive” competition policy
enforcement.193
Until recently, Mexico has had no national, private-sector consumer
organization.194 That is changing with the emergence of non-governmental
organizations focused on consumer issues such as Observatel, a watchdog of
reforms in the telecommunications sector,195 the consumer organization group Al
Consumidor A.C.,196 and Contraloría Ciudadana, which monitors public
policies—including competition—and the fight against corruption.197 These
organizations push vocally for legislative changes and help keep competition and
its effects on consumers on the public agenda. Another way in which the
consumers’ interests are represented is through Mexico’s Office of the Federal
Prosecutor for the Consumer (PROFECO). In 2005—on the recommendation of
the OECD’s 2004 Peer Review of Mexico—the FCC entered into an agreement
with PROFECO to allow for more communication and coordination between the
agencies.198 PROFECO has been a potential source of information for the FCC
and the COFECE, as it monitors some sectors such as tortillas for signs of price-

189. ECONOMIST, supra note 48.
190. Carlos M. Urzúa, Distributive and Regional Effects of Monopoly Power, 22 ECONOMÍA
MEXICANA 279, 290 (2013).
191. Eleanor M. Fox, Competition Law and Policy in Africa, Presentation at the Duke University
Law School Seminar (Apr. 10, 2015).
192. MANCUR OLSON, THE LOGIC OF COLLECTIVE ACTION: PUBLIC GOODS AND THE THEORY OF
GROUPS 2 (1965).
193. BEN ROSS SCHNEIDER, HIERARCHICAL CAPITALISM IN LATIN AMERICA: BUSINESS, LABOR,
AND THE CHALLENGES OF EQUITABLE DEVELOPMENT 152 (2013).
194. OECD 2004, supra note 4, at 71.
195. Elisabeth Malkin, New Rules to Reshape Telecom in Mexico, N.Y. TIMES (Mar. 7, 2014),
http://www.nytimes.com/2014/03/08/business/international/new-rules-to-reshape-telecom-inmexico.html?_r=0 [https://perma.cc/6YVN-N3B8] (LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. archive only).
196. See, e.g., Crayton Harrison, Mexican Antitrust Regulator Puts Pressure on Billionaires,
BLOOMBERG (June 12, 2012, 4:27 PM), http://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2012-06-12/mexicanantitrust-regulator-puts-pressure-on-billionaires (describing Al Consumidor’s criticism of the FCC’s
settlement with America Movil SAB, owned by billionaire Carlos Slim).
197. Observatorio Ciudadano de Competencia Económica, CONTRALORÍA CIUDADANA,
http://www.contraloriaciudadana.org.mx/respaldo/?p=pj [https://perma.cc/AA6L-CR27] (last visited
May 22, 2016).
198. OECD 2007, supra note 171, at 34.

AYDIN (DO NOT DELETE)

180

12/9/2016 1:47 PM

LAW AND CONTEMPORARY PROBLEMS

[Vol. 79: 155

fixing.199 The FCC opened investigations in the poultry cartel case, for instance,
based on information provided by PROFECO.200 Moreover, PROFECO has had
the right to introduce the equivalent of class action suits in competition cases
since 2011, which could add to the deterrent effect of competition law in Mexico.
It recently brought two such cases against dominant landline and cellular phone
companies Telmex and Telcel to attempt to recover money on behalf of millions
of consumers.201
Consumers’ roles in strengthening competition law and policy in Mexico have
been multiple. First, consumer organizations and PROFECO have raised
awareness about the lack of competition in Mexican markets and its effects on
consumers, thus contributing to the competition culture in Mexico. They have
also aided enforcement efforts by being sources of information for the FCC and
COFECE, as well as putting pressure on these organizations to be transparent
and accountable. Finally, consumers as voters may have helped elect presidents
with reform platforms aimed at increasing economic competition since the
elections in 2000, which for the first time in seventy-one years brought a party
other than the Institutional Revolutionary Party (Partido Institucional
Revolucionario) to power.202 President Vicente Fox (2000 through 2006) included
reforming the telecommunications and electricity industries and increasing the
autonomy of regulatory agencies in his campaign agenda.203 President Felipe
Calderón (2006 through 2012) promised to dismantle monopolies and increase
competition.204 And finally, in 2012, Enrique Peña Nieto’s reform agenda
resulted, after his election, in the Pact for Mexico (Pacto por México), an
agreement between the three main parties of Mexico on a broad package of
reforms, including competition law. It is difficult to know the extent to which
economic reform issues play a role on voters’ choices in Mexico, but the growing
publicity around consumers’ concerns has gone hand in hand with the election of
presidents with reform agendas aimed at increasing competition in Mexican
markets.

199. Mexico’s Economy: Monopolies and Tortillas, ECONOMIST (Jan. 19, 2007),
http://www.economist.com/node/8575130 [https://perma.cc/2NJV-7KDN].
200. COMISIÓN FEDERAL DE COMPETENCIA, supra note 176, at 37.
201. Garcia de la Rosa, supra note 172, at 11 n.15.
202. Carlos Elizondo, After the Second of July: Challenges and Opportunities for the Fox
Administration, in MEXICO’S POLITICS AND SOCIETY IN TRANSITION 29 (Joseph S. Tulchin & Andrew
D. Selee eds., 2003).
203. MARIA VICTORIA MURILLO, POLITICAL COMPETITION, PARTISANSHIP, AND POLICY
MAKING IN LATIN AMERICAN PUBLIC UTILITIES 210 (2009).
204. Mexico’s President Moves Against Monopolies, BLOOMBERG (Oct. 12, 2009, 10:03 PM),
http://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2009-10-12/mexicos-president-moves-against-monopolies
[https://perma.cc/9JBG-KXN4]; Shannon K. O’Neill, Taking on Mexico’s Monopolies, COUNCIL ON
FOREIGN REL.: LATIN AM.’S MOMENT (Apr. 18, 2011), http://blogs.cfr.org/oneil/2011/04/18/taking-onmexico’s-monopolies [https://perma.cc/3WLR-SD9A].
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2. Think Tanks and Business Associations
Societal actors such as the influential think tank Mexican Institute for
Competitiveness (Instituto Mexicano para la Competitividad)—whose projects
are funded in part by international organizations such as the World Bank, OECD
and bilateral donors such as the United States, Britain, and Germany—have
contributed to this debate by emphasizing the importance of competitive
domestic markets to increase Mexico’s international competitiveness.205 It is
indicative of the Institute’s influence that its former director, Alejandra Palacios
Prieto, is now the head of the COFECE. The Research Centre for Development
(Centro de Investigación para el Desarrollo) has also conducted research on
competition law and policy206 and offered opinions on reform proposals.207 These
two think tanks, along with IFETEL, COFECE, the Institute of the Federal
Judiciary, and the Center for Research and Teaching in Economics now form the
Alliance for Competition (Alianza por la Competencia), which supports public
activities and research on competition law and policy, and is supported by
bilateral donors and international organizations.208 The impact of these
organizations has been to raise awareness about competition law and policy
among firms and society, as well as political actors.
Private sector representatives, such as the Business Coordinating Council
(Consejo Coordinador Empresarial) have also highlighted the importance of
economic competition to promote more inclusive and healthier markets and
called for reforming the FCC to achieve these ends.209 The related Center for
Economic Studies of the Private Sector (Centro de Estudios Económicos del
Sector Privado) published a survey of business people in 2005, which pointed to
public and private monopolies as the most important obstacles in the markets for
business development.210 Some business interests, such as the Mexican Council
for Businessmen (Consejo Mexicano de Hombres de Negocios), are also
represented through their support of think tanks such as the Mexican Institute
for Competitiveness.
205. See, e.g., INSTITUTO MEXICANO PARA LA COMPETITIVIDAD, NOS CAMBIARON EL MAPA:
MÉXICO ANTE LA REVOLUCIÓN ENERGÉTICA DEL SIGLO XXI (2013); INSTITUTO MEXICANO PARA LA
COMPETITIVIDAD, UN PUNTO DE INFLEXIÓN (2006) (reporting the competitiveness index, elaborated
and published by the Mexican Institute for Competitiveness, which includes the government’s promotion
of competition as a variable).
206. See, e.g., CENTRO DE INVESTIGACIÓN PARA EL DESARROLLO, ESTUDIO SOBRE EL COMBATE
A LA COLUSIÓN EN COMPRAS PÚBLICAS EN AMÉRICA LATINA (2014) (analyzing public procurement
laws in fourteen Latin American countries, and identifying best practices to prevent bid rigging in public
procurement).
207. VICTOR M. FRÍAS, REFORMAS A LA LEY FEDERAL DE COMPETENCIA ECONÓMICA (2013),
http://reddecompetencia.cidac.org/es/uploads/1/REFORMAS_A_LA_LEY_FEDERAL_DE_
COMPETENCIA_ECON__MICA.pdf [https://perma.cc/K3DX-MNK4].
208. Acerca de, ALIANZA POR LA COMPETENCIA, http://www.alianzaxcompetencia.mx/acerca-de/
(last visited July 1, 2016).
209. CONSEJO COORDINADOR EMPRESARIAL, AGENDA DE COMPETITIVIDAD 2010–2011 195
(2011).
210. CENTRO DE ESTUDIOS ECONÓMICOS DEL SECTOR PRIVADO, ENCUESTA SOBRE
GOBERNABILIDAD Y DESARROLLO EMPRESARIAL 2005 5 (2005).
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Finally, competition law practitioners as well as the Mexican Bar Association
(Barra Mexicana Colegio de Abogados) have had input in the reform process.
As frequent users of the system, individual lawyers and the bar association have
voiced their concerns about the deficiencies and possible biases of the system,
and questioned its effectiveness.211 The Bar Association also contributes to
training programs for judges and regulators on competition issues.212
These domestic actors—with significant international ties through funding
and joint projects—have played a meaningful role in the reform process in
multiple ways. First, they help generate a competition culture among firms and
the public through their research, publications, conferences, seminars, and
trainings. Second, especially as users of the system, lawyers and the Bar
Association have been vocal critics of the FCC’s procedures and functioning,213
and thus have contributed to its internal reform process. Finally, their opinions
on the reform proposals have been inputs for legislative reforms.
3. Domestic Firms
Individual firms that have difficulty entering markets dominated by large
players have been another source of support for the FCC/COFECE. Such firms
typically bring complaints to the agency and challenge dominant firms’ anticompetitive conduct in the courts. For instance, Avantel, a Mexican cellular
provider,214 sued Telmex nine times for abuse of dominance.215 The same
company used the Freedom of Information Act to force COFETEL to provide it
with a copy of the concession title granted to Telmex by the government in 2007,
thus helping to increase the transparency of the sector regulator.216 As the
competition regime in Mexico strengthens and judicial uncertainty abates,
domestic firms will be increasingly motivated to bring complaints about
competition infringements. This has the potential to reduce the burden on
COFECE in identifying and sanctioning infringements.

211. Guerrero Rodriguez & Ramírez, supra note 59, at 403–06; Omar Guerrero Rodríguez, ¿Por qué
México necesita una ley de competencia?, FORBES MÉXICO (Dec. 23, 2014),
http://www.forbes.com.mx/por-que-mexico-necesita-una-ley-de-competencia [https://perma.cc/8GSF3RCU]; Javier Tejado Dondé, Los juzgados cooptados por el regulador, EL UNIVERSAL (Sept. 8, 2015,
1:55 AM), http://www.eluniversal.com.mx/entrada-de-opinion/columna/javier-tejado-donde/cartera/
2015/09/8/los-juzgados-cooptados-por-el [https://perma.cc/X5XP-YLBT].
212. Elsa González, Clausura del Primer Encuentro Nacional en Competencia Económica, CANAL
JUDICIAL (Feb. 5, 2014), https://canaljudicial.wordpress.com/tag/barra-mexicana-colegio-de-abogados
[https://perma.cc/E3F4-QK6J].
213. See supra note 91.
214. Avantel had forty-five percent foreign ownership until it was acquired by Axtel in 2006.
MURILLO, supra note 203, at 216 n.46 (2009); El Universal, CIERRA AXTEL COMPRA DE AVANTEL (Dec.
4, 2006), http://archivo.eluniversal.com.mx/notas/391987.html [https://perma.cc/5RWD-BCHQ].
215. Guerrero, López-Calva & Walton, supra note 91, at 129.
216. Deberá Cofetel entregar información a Avantel, EL UNIVERSAL (June 17, 2007, 10:43 AM),
http://archivo.eluniversal.com.mx/notas/431655.html [https://perma.cc/FN8D-WH4N].
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B. International Factors
In interaction with these domestic actors, a number of international actors
have been sources of pressure or support for the improvement of the Mexican
competition regime.
1. Foreign Firms Trying to Access the Mexican Market
Foreign firms have been a source of pressure on the Mexican government to
improve the effectiveness of competition law and sector regulations. For instance,
in 2000 the U.S. government brought a dispute against Mexico in the World
Trade Organization—principally on behalf of AT&T and MCI217—claiming that
Mexican telecommunications regulator breached its obligations under the
General Agreement on Trade in Services.218 COFETEL had granted Telmex, as
the firm with the largest share of the outgoing calls, the power to fix the
termination rate to be paid by all foreign carriers—for example, AT&T and
MCI—for calls terminating in Mexico.219 The GATS ruled against Mexico in
2004, a decision that the Mexican government did not appeal,220 and forced
COFETEL to change the regulations. This has had a significant downward
impact on international settlement rates—they fell from approximately $0.40 per
minute in 1997 to approximately $0.02 in 2007 in areas open to long distance
competition—and on the price of international calls.221 Mexico’s greater
economic openness, and its bilateral, regional, and multilateral trade agreements
mean that foreign firms will increasingly seek access to domestic markets and
generate pressure for better enforcement of competition laws. As a result of
recent reforms allowing for greater foreign ownership in telecommunications
companies, AT&T acquired the third and fourth large players in the mobile
phone market in Mexico, generating pressures for better services and lower
prices.222
2. International Organizations and Regulatory Networks
The International Monetary Fund, the World Bank, and the World Economic
Forum have long emphasized the lack of competition as a significant impediment
to the growth of the Mexican economy.223 The recommendations of these
217. Eleanor M. Fox, The WTO’s First Antitrust Case—Mexican Telecom: A Sleeping Victory for
Trade and Competition, 9 J. INT’L ECON. L. 271, 278 (2006).
218. Mexico - Measures Affecting Telecommunications Services, WORLD TRADE ORGANIZATION,
https://www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/dispu_e/cases_e/ds204_e.htm
[https://perma.cc/WK8M-3AEK]
(last visited June 10, 2016).
219. Fox, supra note 217, at 276.
220. United States-Mexico Telecommunications WTO Dispute, ICT REGULATION TOOLKIT,
http://www.ictregulationtoolkit.org/en/toolkit/notes/PracticeNote/2592 [https://perma.cc/5D5F-UW2U]
(last visited Apr. 9, 2016).
221. del Villar, supra note 99, at 340.
222. Mexico Telecom Prices Fall After Reform Aimed at Curbing Slim, REUTERS (Mar. 8, 2015, 4:01
PM),
http://www.reuters.com/article/mexico-telecommunications-prices-idUSL5N0WA0R220150308
[https://perma.cc/3LKK-9EM3].
223. INTERNATIONAL MONETARY FUND, STAFF COUNTRY REPORTS, MEXICO NO. 06/351 17
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organizations are frequently reported in the national media and become part of
the public debate, and have thus been important inputs for reform.224 For
instance, presenting his proposal for reform of the competition law in 2010
(eventually passed in 2011), President Felipe Calderón explained that the
proposal was meant to address lack of competition in the Mexican economy,
which he saw as an impediment to investment, growth, and efforts to address
inequality and poverty, citing an OECD report on the impact of uncompetitive
markets on vulnerable sections of the society.225 In the process leading to the
adoption of the reforms, Pérez Motta, the chairman of the FCC at the time,
similarly cited the country’s ranking in the World Economic Forum’s annual
competitiveness index—number sixty that year—to draw attention to the lack of
competition in the Mexican economy.226
Organizations such as the OECD and the ICN have had an even more direct
impact on the reform process in Mexico.227 The OECD Competition Division
worked closely with the FCC. Many of the recommendations of the 1998 OECD
Report on Regulatory Reform in Mexico228 and the 2004 Peer Review of Mexican
competition law and policy229 found their way into the legislative reform
proposals. These documents were also crucially important in the FCC’s efforts to
convince the legislators of the need for reform in competition law in 2006. The
FCC commented in its submission to the OECD that
The OECD’s peer review provided a neutral voice to the discussion by presenting a
non-partisan analysis of the state of competition policy in Mexico and simply outlining
best practices based on its experience in the area with OECD member countries. The
Report was used and cited in communications with the legislature and federal public
administration.230

The OECD also provided lengthy comments on the draft of the reforms, and
a letter summarizing OECD’s opinion on the reforms written by the head of the
OECD Competition Division was shared with the Mexican legislators in the
process leading up to the adoption of the reforms. The 2011 reform likewise drew

(2006); WORLD BANK, supra note 17, at 47; Guerrero Rodriguez & Ramírez, supra note 59, at 396.
224. On the influence of foreign models in public reform debates, see generally KATERINA LINOS,
THE DEMOCRATIC FOUNDATIONS OF POLICY DIFFUSION: HOW HEALTH, FAMILY AND EMPLOYMENT
LAWS SPREAD ACROSS COUNTRIES (2013).
225. Lilia González, Firma Calderón Ley de Competencia Económica, EL ECONOMISTA (May 9,
2011, 4:59 PM), http://eleconomista.com.mx/industrias/2011/05/09/firma-calderon-ley-competenciaeconomica [https://perma.cc/5WBX-MUVH]; Lizbeth Padilla, Castigar con cárcel monopolios: FCH, EL
ECONOMISTA (Apr. 6, 2010, 12:46 AM), http://eleconomista.com.mx/industrias/2010/04/06/castigarcarcel-monopolios-fch [https://perma.cc/BS3N-U49T].
226. Lilia González Velázquez, Acercaría al país a las mejores prácticas, EL ECONOMISTA (Apr. 6,
2010, 12:34 AM), http://eleconomista.com.mx/industrias/2010/04/06/acercaria-pais-las-mejores-practicas
[https://perma.cc/8S3Y-67Y4].
227. On OECD’s influence as a transnational diffuser of ideas and policies, see FABRIZIO DE
FRANCESCO, TRANSNATIONAL POLICY INNOVATION: THE OECD AND THE DIFFUSION OF
REGULATORY IMPACT ANALYSIS (2013).
228. OECD 1998, supra note 3.
229. OECD 2004, supra note 4.
230. OECD 2007, supra note 171, at 34.

AYDIN (DO NOT DELETE)

No. 4 2016]

12/9/2016 1:47 PM

COMPETITION LAW AND POLICY IN MEXICO

185

significantly on OECD peer review and follow-ups.231
Finally, the ICN, a virtual network of competition agencies established in
2001,232 has been an important source of expertise and influence on the Mexican
competition regime. The ICN was launched with the aim of contributing to
cooperation and convergence among national competition regimes. Mexico is an
active participant in the ICN. It led the Agency Effectiveness Working Group of
the ICN for some years,233 and Pérez Motta acted as the chairman of the ICN
from 2012 to 2013.234 Interactions among competition agency officials in the ICN,
who are relatively isolated from political pressures and are focused exclusively
on competition law, help foster socialization and mutual learning among the
participants.235 This has been an important promoter of internal reforms of the
FCC/COFECE.236
To summarize, international actors have been influential in strengthening the
Mexican competition regime in multiple ways. Foreign firms seeking access to
domestic markets have forced the Mexican government to change regulations
that impede competition as in the area of telecommunications, and increasingly
their presence in Mexican markets will signify greater competition. International
organizations and transnational networks such as the OECD and the ICN have
motivated many of the internal reforms at the FCC, and have been influential as
neutral external actors in the domestic debates as well as in FCC’s negotiations
with the legislature.
These international pressures facilitated reforms by strengthening the hand
of competition policy reformers in Mexico, though their impact was in no way
guaranteed. Despite all the support of the OECD, the 2006 reform took nine
months of analysis and negotiations between the FCC and the legislature.237 The
2011 reform took a year to pass the Congress.238 In communicating and
negotiating closely with the lawmakers, the FCC comprehended the importance
of political maneuvering and negotiations,239 and excelled at this under the

231. OECD, FOLLOW-UP TO THE NINE PEER REVIEWS OF COMPETITION LAW AND POLICY OF
LATIN AMERICAN COUNTRIES 35 (2012).
232. Maria Coppola, ICN Best Practices: Soft Law, Concrete Results, 7 CPI ANTITRUST CHRON., July
2011, at 1, 2; Eleanor M. Fox, Linked-In: Antitrust and the Virtues of a Virtual Network, 43 INT’L LAW.
151, 160 (2009).
233. INT’L COMPETITION NETWORK, ICN AGENCY EFFECTIVENESS WORKING GROUP 2013-2016
WORK PLAN 1 (2013), http://www.internationalcompetitionnetwork.org /uploads/library/doc914.pdf
[https://perma.cc/5VWB-XAMD].
234. Eduardo Pérez Motta, Chair’s Report: 2012-2013 ICN Achievements, COMPETITION POL’Y
INT’L, (Sept. 6, 2013), https://www.competitionpolicyinternational.com/chair-s-report-2012-2013-icnaccomplishments/ [https://perma.cc/YL5L-V5DE] (last visited Jun. 10, 2016).
235. On socialization in international organizations, see Jeffrey T. Checkel, International Institutions
and Socialization in Europe: Introduction and Framework, 59 INT’L ORG. 801 (2005).
236. Ali Haddou, Panel Discussion: Antitrust Developments in India and Mexico, in ANNUAL
PROCEEDINGS OF THE FORDHAM COMPETITION LAW INSTITUTE, supra note 59, at 409, 434.
237. Pérez Motta & Sada Correa, supra note 74, at 21.
238. Hoher, supra note 44, at 5.
239. Pérez Motta & Sada Correa, supra note 74, at 21.
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chairmanship of Pérez Motta.240 Thus although a competition agency’s
independence from the executive branch is of utmost importance in the
effectiveness of competition policy, Mexico’s experience demonstrates that the
agency also has to be able to maneuver through the political process and have
sufficient political backing to carry out its mandate—that is, it must have
“embedded autonomy.”241
VIII
CONCLUSION
The Mexican competition regime is hailed as one of the success stories among
emerging economies today, but it was not always so. In the first fifteen years after
its establishment, the FCC ran into many problems in its enforcement of
competition law, such as insufficient financial resources, legislative loopholes,
delays and defeats at the district courts, and a lack of support for competition law
and policy among the general public and economic actors.
A series of reforms, starting in 2006 and culminating in a fundamental revamp
of the law and the FCC in 2013 through 2014, have addressed many of these
problems, and placed the FCC and COFECE among well-respected competition
authorities in the world. The reforms were possible thanks to a combination of
domestic and international factors that reinforced one another. Domestically, a
constituency for stronger competition policy arose, which include consumer
associations, think tanks, and firms that have been kept out of markets by
dominant firms. And external pressures aided and reinforced these domestic
actors. Foreign firms seeking access to the Mexican markets used bilateral and
international trade agreements to which Mexico was a party in order to push the
Mexican government to end anti-competitive practices. International
organizations and transnational networks also gently pressured and guided the
Mexican policymakers with their expert evaluations, and helped move the
domestic debate towards concrete legislative action, both directly and indirectly
through their support for think tanks and nongovernmental organizations in
Mexico.
Some broader conclusions can be drawn from the Mexican experience for
countries with recently adopted competition laws. Most importantly,
international pressures—in the form of financial and technical assistance, and
conditionality—alone will not lead to effective enforcement of competition laws
in developing countries. Domestic ownership of the law by companies, consumer
organizations, think tanks, and business associations is needed to raise awareness
of competition law, and to assist in competition agencies’ enforcement efforts.
International support in the form of expert opinions, reports, and technical
assistance will be much more effective in promoting reforms if it can rely on the
existence of a domestic constituency in favor of competition law and policy.

240. Not for attribution interview, Washington, D.C. (Mar. 25, 2015).
241. Aydin & Büthe, supra note 19, at 30–31.

